NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF CALIFORNIA'S
CONTRACTORS' LICENSE LAW
During 1966 three decisions were rendered in California which will noticeably affect the Contractors' License Law found in the Business and Prof essions Code.' One of these decisions, Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court,' has
formally acknowledged a substantial, rather than strict, interpretation of
section 7031 of the Contractors' Law which requires contractors to be
"duly licensed ... at all times" during performance in order to bring an
action for compensation. The other decisions, Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.3 and Brunzell Construction Company, Inc. of Nevada v. Barton Development Company,4 have construed section 7026 of this code
which defines the term "contractor" in conflicting decisions which indicate
a need for legislative clarification.

SECTION

703 1:

STRICT V. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE

Regulation of the various trades and professions through licensing is today
recognized as meeting a public need.' Where a license is required by statute
for the protection of the public to prevent improper persons from acting in
a particular capacity, absolute failure to license will bar enforcement of
the contract.'
With this in mind, the California Legislature in 1939 enacted the Contractors' License Law as part of the Business and Professions Code. Section 7031 of that code provides:
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action in any court in this State for the
collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract
for which a license is required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the
performance of such act or contract. 7 [Emphasis added.]
The primary intent of the Legislature in enacting the Contractors' License
Law was to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of all persons
dealing with those engaged in the contracting business and to afford the
public effective and practical protection against incompetent, inexperienced, unlawful and fraudulent acts of building contractors.' However
1 Contractors' License Law, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§7000-7145.
2 64 Cal.2d 278, 49 Cal.Rptr. 676 (1966).
3 239 Cal.App.2d 664, 48 Cal.Rptr. 901 (1966).
4 240 Cal.App.2d 442, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667 (1966).
5 Howard v. State, 85 Cal.App.2d 361, 193 P.2d 11 (1948).
6See 23 So. CAL. L. REV. 98 (1949).
7 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §7031 was added by stat. 1939, §1, ch. 37, p. 384.
8 16 CAL. ADM. CODE 14.
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clear the legislative intent may be, it appears that the courts have not
always agreed on a proper interpretation of the statutes. Thus, while some
California courts have applied section 7031 literally in spite of the equities
of the particular case, others have held that absolute compliance with the
statutory provisions is not a condition precedent to contractual recovery.
In the 1957 case of Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons,9 often cited as
advocating the strict compliance approach to section 7031, the contractor
contended that recovery should be allowed on his construction contract
even though he had not strictly complied with the licensing statute on the
grounds that such a recovery would prevent unjust enrichment. However,
this contention was rejected, with Justice Traynor stating:
Section 7031 represents a legislative determination that the importance
of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the parties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by denying violators the right to maintain
any action for compensation in the courts of the state. 10
In enforcing a literal interpretation of the statute the court recognized
that the Legislature was as much concerned with protecting the public
from dishonesty and incompetence in the administrationof the contracting
business as in the actual use of bricks, mortar, and earth-moving equipment."
In the 1959 case of Bierman v. Hagstrom Construction Company12 a
subcontractor was denied recovery for his services when he failed to renew
his license for a period of five weeks during the job. Justice Wood distinguished this case from earlier substantial compliance cases by stating,
"....

in those cases someone had a license at all times during the perform-

ance of the work." "aOne year later in Steinwinter v. Maxwell"' the court
again followed the literal compliance approach to deny a partnership recovery. Steinwinter held a valid contractor's license but his partner Bancroft did not. Steinwinter and Bancroft were sole stockholders and president and vice president respectively of another contracting corporation
which was duly licensed. Therefore, both individuals had been approved
by the licensing board for the issuance of the corporation license. In denying the partnership recovery the court stated:
The application of the substantial compliance rule has been limited to
very few cases and we do not feel it should be extended to this case. The
partners knew or should have known, that they were required to have a
Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
1Id. at 151, 308 P.2d 713, 719.

948
0

11

Id. at 149-150, 308 P.2d 713, 718.

12

176 Cal.App.2d 771, 1 Cal.Rptr. 826 (1959).

13 Id. at 777, 1 Cal.Rptr. 826, 830.
14183 Cal.App.2d 34, 6 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1960).
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contractor's license. They had a valid license in their corporation which
they could have used. For reasons unknown they chose not to use it.' 5

However, other courts have not been moved to apply the language of
section 7031 literally. In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry, 6 apparently the
first of the substantial compliance cases, a contractor contracted as an
individual but allowed his license to expire during performance. He completed the work under the auspices of his corporation which was issued a
license in lieu of renewing the individual's license. The court stated:
Where a manifestly unjust and inequitable result would follow a holding
that plaintiff contractor was without capacity to sue on his contract, the
individual plaintiff in whose name the license stood at the time the contract was made and the corporate entity organized by him in whose
name the license stood at the time the cause of action accrued, should
7
be considered as one.'
In cases following this decision, courts found substantial compliance

with section 7031 sufficient when licensed individuals acquired a joint
venture license during performance of work with the approval of the other

contracting party; '" when an individual contractor not licensed at the time
the contract was executed due to a new classification system became
licensed when notified of the new requirement; " and when an individual
was licensed but the contract was assigned to a corporation formed by the

individual with an interval of time lapsing before the corporation was
licensed.2"

15 Id.at 38, 6 Cal.Rptr. 496, 499.
1620 Cal.App.2d 415, 67 P.2d 364 (1937). While this case was heard before the present
statute was enacted in 1939, the present statute is similar to that which was in effect when this
case was heard, the only difference being that the earlier statute provided as a penalty for
failing to comply with the licensing requirement a fine or imprisonment or both, not, to exceed
$500.00 or 6 months.
17 Id. at 420, 67 P.2d 364, 366-367.
18 Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 (1946).
A 1967 decision involving joint venturers, Proffitt & Durnell Plumbing v. David H. Baer
Company (247 Adv.Cal.App. 596, 55 Cal.Rptr. 764) barred recovery under §§7029 and 7031
of the Business & Professions Code by dismissing an action by a licensed plumbing contractor
against a licensed air-conditioning contractor where the former had submitted their combined
bid to the prime contractor. The court held plaintiff was not entitled to recover because he had
not secured an additional license for acting in the capacity of a joint venturer as required by
§7029, and therefore was not "licensed" as required by §7031. The Proffitt court relied heavily
on Currie v. Stolowitz (169 Cal.App.2d 810, 338 P.2d 208 (1959)) and Lewis & Queen v. N.
M. Ball Sons (48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957)) which had also denied recovery. Yet, the
latter two cases were decided before a 1961 amendment was made to §7031 excepting from its
provisions ". . . contractors who are individually licensed under this chapter but who fail to
comply with Section 7029." The amended version of this section was not quoted by the court
and no effort was made to exclude the Proffitt case from its purview.
19 Oddo v. Hedde, 101 Cal.App.2d 375, 225 P.2d 929 (1950).
20
Weiman v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 710, 336 P.2d 489 (1959).
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However, not until the 1966 case of Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court2
did any court summarize the elements of the substantial compliance doctrine. In this case Justice Tobriner of California's Supreme Court stated
the elements necessary to assert the doctrine: (1) that the contractor have
a valid license at time of contracting [emphasis added]; (2) that he
readily secures a renewal of that license; and (3) that the responsibility
and competence of the contractor's managing officer are officially confirmed throughout the period of performance of the contract.22
The facts in Latipac which prompted the court's elaboration of the
substantial compliance doctrine involved a contracting corporation which
was duly licensed when the contract was executed but whose license expired fifteen months after commencement of the work. The contractor
continued to perform for ten months and completed the job without renewing the license. In allowing recovery the court stressed that the moment when existence of the license becomes determinative is when the
contracting party decides whether the contractor possesses the requisite
responsibility and competence and decides whether or not to enter into
the relationship. The court stated that "the license, as an official confirmation of the contractor's responsibility and experience, then plays its
important role." 23
In view of this decision it would seem in spite of the clear language of
section 7031 that contractors must be licensed "at all times" during performance, the California Supreme Court regards it mandatory only that a
valid license be held at the time the contract is executed. Since other
substantial compliance decisions (on which the Latipac court relied) have
been on record for many years without legislative action to amend the
statute, it would appear that the Legislature has given its approval to a
substantial compliance approach where the equities warrant. 4 It is submitted that the substantial compliance interpretation of this law as now set
forth in the Latipac decision reaches the more equitable result in many
situations and should be approved by continued acquiescence on the part
of the Legislature.
II
SECTION

7026:

WHAT IS A CONTRACTOR?

The question confronting the California courts prior to the 1966 case of
Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.2 was whether the factual situation
2164 Cal.2d 278, 49 Cal.Rptr. 676 (1966).
22 Id. at 281-282, 49 Cal.Rptr. 676, 679.
23 Id. at 282, 49 Cal.Rptr. 676, 680.

24 See 10 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 89, 91 (1958).

25 239 Cal.App.2d 664, 48 Cal.Rptr. 901 (1966).
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justified application of the substantial compliance doctrine. With the Conderback decision, however, a more basic question has now arisen; namely,
what is a "California contractor" within the meaning of section 7026 of
the Contractors' Licensing Law. This section provides:
The term contractor for the purposes of this chapter is synonymous
with the term "builder" and, within the meaning of this chapter, a contractor is any person who undertakes to or offers to undertake to or purports to have the capacity to undertake to or submits a bid to, or does
himself or by or through others, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract
from, improve, move, wreck or demolish any building, highway, road
parking facility, railroad, excavation or other structures or works in
connection therewith. The term contractor includes subcontractor and
specialty contractor. 26 [Emphasis added.]
The Conderback case involved a California corporation, domiciled in San
Francisco, which was engaged in the business of building advertising exhibits. From 1960 until it suspended operations in July of 1963 over 300
such exhibits were completed by the Conderback corporation for Standard
Oil in California without litigation between the parties. However, the Conderback corporation had never been involved with actual construction
work, as defined in section 7026, until July of 1961 when it contracted in
San Francisco to construct Standard Oil's building and exhibit at the
Seattle World's Fair. During construction of this building in the State of
Washington the concept of the exhibit was changed several times by
Standard Oil and as a result Conderback lost control of the budget, the
design and all coordination between the parties. Upon completion a dispute
arose as to payment. Conderback's demands were rejected and litigation
resulted with a judgment in favor of Conderback.
On appeal to the District Court of Appeals, Standard Oil's first attack
was aimed at the heart of the judgment. It contended that Conderback
could not bring or maintain the action (under section 7031) since it was
acting in the capacity of a contractor in California (as defined in section
7026) without being duly licensed.
Conderback had no contractor's license whatsoever during the entire
time of performance. The State of Washington did not, at that time, have
a law requiring licensing of general contractors. Nevertheless, Conderback
undertook in California to submit a bid and to administer a substantial
portion of the construction work from San Francisco. Certain exhibits
were fabricated in San Francisco and then transported to Seattle, and the
building itself was designed by an industrial engineer in consultation with
a structural engineer and an architect in San Francisco. Conderback would
therefore seem to be clearly acting in the capacity of a contractor in California within the meaning of section 7026 of the Business and Professions
26 CAL.

Bus. & PROF.

CODE

§7026 (1963) as amended.
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Code. However, the court held that where "a person offers, undertakes or
contracts in this state to construct or demolish a building, project or other
improvement located outside of California,such person does not thereby
become one engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor within this state so as to be subject to the Contractors' License Law." 27
[Emphasis added.] Nor did the court feel the fact that the person's principal place of business was located in California necessarily compelled a
28

different conclusion.

It is to be noted that this court's interpretation of the law was inconsistent with a 1963 Attorney General's opinion on this subject:
Whether a person is engaging in the business or acting in the capacity
of a contractor may be determined from the statutory definition of a
contractor which is contained in section 7026.... Thus a non-resident
who mails his bid or otherwise communicates his bid .into California for
consideration here "submits" his bid within the state. An act of contracting thus takes 2place
within California requiring a California state
9
contractor's license.

Within one month of the Conderback decision a contrary interpretation
of the statute, mirroring the 1963 Attorney General's opinion, was adopted
in Brunzell Construction Company, Inc. of Nevada v. Barton Development Company.3" In Brunzell, a Nevada corporation not licensed as a
contractor in California was denied damages for anticipatory breach of the
contract. The sole shareholder and responsible managing officer of the
unlicensed corporation was individually licensed in California as a general
contractor and he was also sole shareholder and managing officer of a sister corporation which was a duly licensed California corporation. The
facts appeared to leave no question as to the qualifications of the Nevada
corporation to act in the capacity of a contractor. The contract was for
the construction of an apartment house on land situated in California.
Three months after executing the contract and before any actual construction work had commenced the other party sold the property without
advising the Nevada corporation. While rejecting the contractor's contention that his right to recovery was not barred under section 7031 because
recovery was sought for anticipatory breach rather than performance, the
court commented:
It seems to us an overly narrow construction of the code section 7031.
Strictly applied, it would lead to the odd rule that one who could not
recover for full performance of a contract could nonetheless recover for
not performing it at all. In submitting its bid and executing a contract,
27 Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 239 Cal.App.2d 664, 679, 48 Cal.Rptr. 901, 912

(1966).
28 Ibid.
29 41 OPs. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 96, 97 (1963).
30 240 Cal.App.2d 442, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667 (1966).
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plaintiff performed acts in the capacity of a contractor. Its action to
recover compensation for these acts thus falls within the prescription of
section 703 1.31 [Emphasis added.]

The business of a general contractor may be said to have two interrelated
aspects; physical labor at the job site, and administrative paperwork.
Each of these activities is a part of the total construction operation. For
the most part, the provisions of the Contractors' License Law govern the
administrative side of the contracting business, such as licensing, signing
and displaying of license, reporting workmen's compensation coverage,
license renewals, obtaining construction permits, reporting changes of

personnel, etc.32 Not one of the provisions of this Law purports to regulate

the manner in which physical labor, such as earth-moving and building, is
to be carried out. That aspect of the contractor's job is covered by local
building codes. 3 However, the court in Conderback appeared to be concerned only with actual construction work and seemingly did not consider the adverse possibilities which could result from inept handling of
purely administrative aspects of the job. Yet, litigation in Conderback
arose not as a result of any difficulties in the actual construction work, but
as a direct result of administrative work performed in California-in this
instance, financial difficulties caused by the contractor's inability to control the budget. Without proper estimating, planning and other administrative details concerned with construction contracts, the general welfare
of contracting parties and all concerned is just as adversely affected as
when faulty building practices are employed. Should California allow
negotiation, bidding and contracting within the state by unlicensed contractors merely because most of the work is to be performed elsewhere, as
was condoned in the Conderback case? It would seem that an affirmative
answer to this question would be contrary to the decision rendered in
Brunzell,3 4 the opinion expressed by California's Attorney General" and
the clear language of section 7026 of the Business and Professions Code.
In comparing Conderback and Brunzell, it should be noted that neither
contractor held a valid license; both contractors "undertook or offered to
undertake" 3 6 construction work in California; both "purported to have
31 Id.

at 444, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667, 668-669. It appears noteworthy that the terms of the con-

tract called for $1,000,000.00 to be paid to the contractor in cash and the remaining $450,000.00 by promissory notes of the owners. In denying the action on the contract, the court
allowed the contractor to amend, stating "the allegations of fraud states a cause of action not
barred
by the plaintiff's lack of a license."
32
CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE §§7066-7069; §7075; §7125; §§7140-7145; §7031.5; §7083.

Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.2d 278, 291, 49 Cal.Rptr. 676, 686. Mosk, J. dissenting.
33

240 Cal.App.2d 442, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667 (1966).
3541 OPs CAL. ATTY. GEN. 96, 97 (1963).
34

36 Statutory language of §7026, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE.
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the capacity" 3 7 to do so; and both "submitted a bid"" s in California in
connection with that construction work. Conderback recovered in an action before the District Court of Appeals, First District, Division One, in
January of 1966; Brunzell was denied recovery by the District Court of
Appeals, First District, Division Three, in February of 1966. In view of
these decisions it is apparent that the statute fails to define its own limits;
it has proven vague and in need of clarification. Is the intent of the Legislature to regulate the contracting business only when actual construction
work is confined to the territorial boundaries of California and to disregard the administrative side of the business when conducted within the
State if the construction work itself is performed elsewhere? The statute
is silent in this respect. However, it would seem that the thoroughness of
this section of the code in its regulation of the administrative details of the
construction business indicates that the Legislature intends to reach not
only contractors who perform physical work in California but also those
who execute their contract in California-even when actual construction
work is to be performed elsewhere.
When the Legislature enacts comprehensive regulatory statutes such
as those comprising the Contractors' License Law the courts should not
lightly create exceptions to them. In view of the apparently inconsistent
interpretations of section 7026 of the statute by two divisions of the District Court of Appeals, it would appear that a clarification defining the
limits of this section is needed and would best be accomplished by legislative amendment.
Robert W. Sickels

37 Ibid.
38

Ibid.

